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Abstract
As individual retirement savings accounts replace public pensions and dened ben-
et schemes, more retirees will decumulate using commercial income streams rather
than public or corporate annuities. Here we use an approximation to the retire-
ment income problem (Huang, Milevsky and Yang 2004) to compute the cost of
replicating a public real life annuity (the Australian Age Pension) using commercial
decumulation products. We treat the public pension as a phased withdrawal plan,
matching insurance and payment features, and back out the stochastic present value
of the plan under an arbitrarily small ruin probability. To reproduce the pension
payment with 99% certainty, a male retiree needs 3.6 times the current average re-
tirement savings account balance, and a female retiree needs more than 10 times the
average female account balance. At 95% certainty, required wealth falls by around
25%. We measure separately the impact of gender, investment strategy, retirement
age and management fees on this valuation.
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1 Introduction
Governments across the world are reviewing pension systems in the light of
increasing public liabilities, and reassessing the basic redistributive pensions
that comprise the rst pillarof retirement savings systems. Basic pensions
ensure that the elderly reach a minimum level of welfare, and are typically
payments of between 20% and 40% of average earnings, targeted towards the
needy via income and assets testing (Whitehouse 2007).
New policies aim to reduce dependence on public funds by encouraging sav-
ing into individual accounts. In addition, more corporate pension providers
are directing members towards dened contribution (DC) rather than dened
benet (DB) schemes. One implication of replacing public pensions (or DB
schemes) with individual accounts is that personal savers often need to de-
cumulate using commercially-provided income streams such as phased with-
drawals or annuities. It follows that one valuation of a public pension is the
cost of reproducing it using these alternative products, in the event that no
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exactly replicating product or strategy exists.
Here we apply new analytical tools from ruin theory to estimate the wealth
that a self-funded retiree needs to generate privately an income stream that is
equivalent to a public pension, matching real value and insurance protection.
We use an approximation to the retirement income problem developed by
Huang et al. (2004) and Milevsky and Robinson (2000, 2005). We calculate
the purchase price and moneys worth 1 of income streams o¤ered in private
nancial markets that closely replicate the Australian basic pension. While
this analysis focuses on the cost of replacing a public real annuity with a
private phased withdrawal, the techniques we apply are general and could be
used to compare many types of decumulation plans.
For an innite horizon and lognormally distributed investment returns, the
stochastic present value of a desired spending plan is reciprocal gamma dis-
tributed. In the more general case, when time horizons are nite and stochas-
tic, the approximate probability of running out of resources before the end of
life can be computed using moment matching arguments. By xing the prob-
ability of ruin at an arbitrarily low level to approximate the small regulatory
risk of the public pension, we can back out the minimum wealth needed to re-
place a pension using available commercial phased withdrawals and annuities.
In addition, we compute the moneys worth of the best phased withdrawal
strategies by calculating the ratio of the simple annuity value of the public
pension stream to the total retirement wealth needed for self-insurance.
The most e¢ cient pension-matching investment strategy is either a Balanced
1 The moneys worth is the ratio of the expected present value of an annuity stream
to its purchase price.
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or Growthportfolio with around 50-70% allocated to equities and property
securities, but this may vary by age, gender and risk tolerance. The moneys
worth ratios of the best strategies are generally below 0.5, they decline as the
retiree ages, and are lower for men than for women. In terms of accumulation,
the retiree needs close to $380,000 at age 65 to ensure the life-long $14,000
p.a. real income now paid by the Australian basic pension. This is more than
four times the average retirement savings account balance of current retirees.
Delaying retirement to age 70 decreases the required accumulation by around
$25,000, while ensuring that the payment stream maintains parity with earn-
ings growth as well as ination increases it by around $90,000. In addition,
for each 1% increase in management fees or administrative loadings, required
wealth rises by around $60,000. Signicantly less is needed if the retiree pools
longevity risk by purchasing commercial life annuities, but voluntary annu-
itization is very rare among Australian retirees, and no commercial product
perfectly matches the basic pension.
Section 2 sets out the main features of the Australian pension system. We
describe the method for calculating the stochastic present value of a spending
plan in Section 3, and Section 4 outlines parameter choices. In Section 5 we
compute the wealth required by men and women of retirement age to construct
a secure pension payment via self-annuitization plans and compare these plans
across a range of key features. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The pension system
Unlike most developed countries, Australia does not have a public, earnings-
linked pension system. 2 This feature, along with the fact that the majority
of Australian retirees rely on both public rst-pillar and private second-pillar
provisions for retirement income, create a natural experiment in the interaction
between targeted government retirement support and mandatory savings into
individual accounts.
Recent survey data show that 70-80% of Australian households over the age
of 64 depend on the basic Age Pension (or the war veterans equivalent) as
their primary source of income (ABS 2006), and as the population ages in
the next four decades, scal funding requirements are expected to increase
(Commonwealth of Australia 2007). Since 1992, Australian workers have con-
tributed a mandatory 9% of income to privately-managed and fully-funded
personal retirement savings accounts, but accumulations are still relatively
modest, currently averaging less than $100,000 at retirement (ASFA 2007)
and projected to be less than $150,000 by 2020. 3 As a result, most retirees
will continue to depend on rst-pillar income support in coming decades.
The current Age Pension for a single home-owner is $525 per fortnight, or
$13,653 p.a. (US $11,880). Pensioners also receive allowances worth more than
$340 p.a. to cover necessary expenses such as utilities and pharmaceuticals. In
the analysis below we study the case of a single home-owning pensioner whose
2 For a complete discussion of the US system see McGill et al. (2005), and for the
UK, see Department for Work and Pensions (2006a, 2006b).
3 Kelly et al. (2002) projects an average balance of $119709 by 2020 in 1999 dollars,
which we scale up by 20% to get an estimate in 2007 dollars.
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annual benet is rounded to $14,000 to encompass the basic payment and the
most common allowances.
The base single pension is recalculated every six months to keep up with
changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and also to ensure that it does not
fall below 25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). Pensioners
thus hold an option on the general level of wages and prices so that the relative
as well as real value of payments is maintained. The adjustment in the base
pension is
Pt
Pt 1
= max [(1 + ht) ; (1 + nt)] (1)
where ht is the rate of increase in the CPI and nt is the rate of increase in
MTAWE over the previous six months. Earnings growth has exceeded ination
for most of the past 15 years. Figure 1 below graphs annualized 6-monthly
paths for ination and MTAWE, since March 1989.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The average annualized increase in the CPI over this period was 3.1% com-
pared with 4.5% for MTAWE and 4.9% for the maximum of both the CPI and
MTAWE.
Means-testing of the Age Pension creates other option-like features over the
wealth of the retired. The means tests begin to reduce the pension at xed
levels of income and/or wealth, tapering to zero as income and/or wealth in-
creases and encouraging higher rates of consumption early in retirement. 4 An
4 Details of Age Pension means-testing are available at
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/. For the remaining analysis we do not study
the pension taper since the majority of retirees receive the full pension.
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optimizing retiree will trade o¤ the marginal advantages of pension eligibility
against the costs of lower wealth/income. On the other hand, means-testing
ensures that retirees with enough personal savings will become ineligible for
government provision, and will rely on private-sector provision of decumula-
tion services.
Since no commercial product replicating the Age Pension is available, ineligi-
bility can expose self-funded retirees to investment and longevity risk. Even
though life annuities fairly similar to the Age Pension are sold, voluntary pur-
chase of longevity insurance is unpopular in Australia, as in many developed
countries (James and Song 2001). The majority of Australian retirees take
their second pillar payouts as discretionary lump-sums or as phased with-
drawal plans. Data on the allocation of Australian retirement savings are
sparse, but survey evidence suggests that 12% of retirement savings are used
to purchase income stream products (ABS 2006), and of that, less that 0.2%
go to life annuities (Plan for Life 2006).
In the next section we outline a method for calculating the stochastic present
value of a pension-equivalent income stream from a phased withdrawal prod-
uct.
3 Stochastic present value of retirement wealth
To compare the public pension with phased withdrawals (which have invest-
ment and longevity risk), we need a method that accounts for the likelihood
7
of failure or ruin under a self-annuitization scheme. 5
Consider a portfolio of risky assets following a geometric Brownian motion
with known drift and di¤usion,
dSt=Stdt+ StdBt (2)
St= e
( 1=22)t+Bt ; S0 = 1: (3)
where Bt is a standard Wiener process. The retiree consumes at a continuous
rate of one dollar per year, so the wealth process is
dWt = dSt   1dt = (Wt   1) dt+ WtdBt;W0 = w; (4)
with solution
Wt = St

w  
Z t
0
S 1t dt

;W0 = w: (5)
The draw-down process (5) can become negative if the drift Wt is small,
precipitating ruin.
We evaluate retirement consumption plans by determining the probability of
exhausting wealth before the end of life:
 (w)  Pr[ inf
0sT
Ws  0jW0 = w]; (6)
or the likelihood that the lowest value of the stochastic process (5) goes to
zero before the retiree reaches the end of life at terminal date, T:
Since the portfolio return St is bounded away from zero, retirement wealth can
go to zero only if the stochastic present value of the spending plan approaches
initial wealth. Therefore the probability of ruin before a pre-determined time
T is
5 In this section we follow Milevsky (2006, chapter 9 and appendix to chapter 9)
and Huang et. al (2004).
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 (w) =Pr[w 
Z T
0
e ( 1=2
2)t Btdt] = 1  Pr[ZT < w]; (7)
ZT 
Z T
0
e ( 1=2
2)t Btdt: (8)
If the time horizon is innite, Huang et al. (2004) prove that the ruin proba-
bility has a closed form analytic solution.
Here we look at the case of an uncertain and nite length of life, where Tx <1
is a random variable following a known mortality law, but where the density
of the random variable ZTx 
R Tx
0 e
 ( 1=22)t Btdt is unknown, and where
the probability of ruin is  (w) = 1  Pr[ZTx < w]:
The rst moment of the distribution of ZTx is
E (ZTx) =
Z 1
0
e ( 
2)t
tpxdt (9)
where tpx is the probability of surviving to age t + x conditional on having
survived to age x: Under a Gompertz law for mortality, (9) evaluates to
M (1)=E [ZTx ] = A (jm; b; x) (10)


  2

A (jm; b; x) b exp

exp

x m
b

+ (x m) 

 

 b; exp

x m
b

where   (u; v) =
R1
v e
 tt(u 1)dt is the incomplete Gamma function, and b and
m are the scale and mode parameters of the Gompertz function. Similarly, the
second moment is
M (2) = E
h
Z2Tx
i
=
 
2
  22
! h
A

  2jm; b; x

  A

2  32jm; b; x
i
:
(11)
Having identied the rst two moments of the true but unknown density
function of ZTx, the issue is to what known density function can they be
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approximated so that ruin probabilities can be evaluated analytically? The
limiting distribution for Z1 (T !1) is a reciprocal Gamma distribution,
Pr [Z < z]  
 
  ()
Z t
0
y (+1)e( 1=y)dy (12)
which has rst and second moments of
M (1) =
1
 (  1) ; M
(2) =
1
2 (  1) (  2) (13)
so that
 =
2M (2)  M (1)M (1)
M (2)  M (1)M (1) ;  =
M (2)  M (1)M (1)
M (2)M (1)
: (14)
Given this limiting result, Huang et al. (2004) propose approximating the
distribution of ZTx by using the moments derived above in equations (10) -
(11) ; substituting into (14) ; and numerically evaluating  (w) = 1 Pr[ZTx <
w] = Pr[ZTx > w] as a reciprocal Gamma random variable.
The probability that a reciprocal Gamma random variable is greater than a
particular value is equal to the probability that a Gamma random variable is
less than the inverse of that value, or,
 (w) = Pr[ inf
0sT
Ws  0jW0 = w] = G

1
w
j; 

; (15)
where the right hand side is the probability that a random variable with a
Gamma distribution dened by  and  is less than 1
w
: (Because one of the
parameters of the Gamma distribution is negative in our numerical problems,
we rescale using the method described in Appendix A.)
A basic pension is like a very safe phased withdrawal plan - one where the
likelihood of ruin is the small, but non-zero, risk that regulators will remove or
reduce the pension payment. If we estimate the ination and earnings-adjusted
drift and di¤usion of a phased withdrawal, and incorporate the mortality of
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a typical retiree, we can x the probability of ruin under the plan at some
arbitrarily small number, say, 1%, and infer the size of required initial wealth
W0 = w using (15): This required wealthW0 = wj (w) = 0:01 is the stochastic
present value of a phased withdrawal (investment and draw-down strategy)
that substantially replicates the Age Pension.
4 Parameter selection
Reproducing the Age Pension payment stream using the stochastic present
value method requires four parameters - the drift and di¤usion terms for the
portfolio process  and , that is the return and volatility of the portfolio
selected by the retiree, and the survival probability; a function of the Gompertz
scale and mode parameters b and m.
4.1 Portfolio return and volatility
Our retiree can select from ve investment strategies, labelled High Growth,
Growth, Balanced, Conservative and Capital Stable. Each is a combination of
two or more asset classes from Australian shares, international shares, Aus-
tralian property securities, Australian xed interest and cash. Portfolio weights
are typical of commercial phased withdrawal products but not necessarily op-
timal (Table 1). The portfolios decline in exposure to growth assets, from 90%
allocation to shares and property in the High Growth fund, 70% in Growth,
50% in Balanced, 30% in the Conservative fund and Capital Stable entirely
invested in cash and xed-interest securities.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
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We collect monthly time series of returns indices for each asset class over the
16-year period, 30 December 1989 30 June 2006, and compute a monthly
periodic return using weights from Table 1. Nominal portfolio returns are
(1 + iP;t) =
Pn
j=1 !j (1 + ij;t) where (1 + iP;t) is the gross nominal monthly
portfolio return over month t, !j is the proportion allocated to asset class j
and (1 + ij;t) is the nominal monthly gross return to asset index j. To translate
this to a real return, we derive a monthly percentage change in the quarterly
CPI by linear interpolation ht (or for MTAWE, nt) and compute the monthly
log-change in the real portfolio return as
rP;t = lnSt   lnSt 1 = ln (1 + iP;t)  ln (1 + ht) (16)
or if we deate by the greater of ination and earnings growth
rP;t = lnSt   lnSt 1 = ln (1 + iP;t)  ln (max [(1 + ht) ; (1 + nt)]) : (17)
The annualized expected value  and volatility  of this process are:
=12
1
T
TX
t=1
(rP;t) +
1
2
2;  = s
p
12; (18)
s=
vuuut 1
T   1
TX
t=1
(rP;t)
2   1
T (T   1)
"
TX
t=1
(rP;t)
#2
;
where T is the number of observations.
Table 2 shows the nominal and real returns and volatilities for each of the port-
folios. The average ination rate is 2.8% and the average earnings-augmented
deation is 4.4%. The relatively low volatility of growth portfolios is partly due
to low volatility in Australian equity returns over this sample period (around
12.5% annualized). We also deduct an indicative management fee from the real
returns, such as are charged by providers of phased withdrawal products o¤er-
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ing similar investments (see, for example, AMP (2007) for accounts of value
100-499K). Jarque-Bera tests of the monthly real log portfolio returns fail to
reject the hypothesis of normality at the 5% level for all portfolios except the
High Growth portfolio where the null is accepted at the 1% level.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
4.2 Gompertz force of mortality
Given an instantaneous force of mortality (t); the conditional probability of
survival under the Gompertz law, tpx; can be expressed as
tpx=exp

 
Z x+t
x
 (s) ds

(19)
=exp
h
bx

1  e tb
i
;
where
 (x) =
1
b
exp

x m
b

: (20)
Parameters b and m are estimated using non-linear least squares as log(px) =
exp

x m
b
 
1  exp 1
b

; taking discrete mortality data, px; from the Australian
Life Tables 2000-2002 (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). The conditional
survival probability px used in estimation is adjusted by 25 year improvement
factors as described in the Life Tables. Model t worsens if the sample includes
the thin mortality data at extreme old age, so the sample runs from ages 50
to 90. Table 3 reports estimation results for males and females. 6
6 The mortality model here we treat as being known with certainty. We do not
account for inaccuracies in the projections of mortality, parameter risk or model
risk in our measures of stochastic present value. For a discussion of the extensive
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
5 Valuing the basic pension
The most obvious way to value the basic pension is as a standard annuity. We
begin with this computation and then use moment matching to approximate
the stochastic present value of equivalent phased withdrawal plans. Finally
we compute the moneys worth of the best phased withdrawals and test the
e¤ects of delaying retirement and of varying management fees.
5.1 Annuity value of the Age Pension
The Age Pension payment is an indexed immediate life annuity. We compute
Vx(A), the expected discounted value of the annuity,
Vx(A) =
T xX
t=1
tpx
A
(1 + r)t
(21)
where A is the pension payment, here assumed to be $14,000 p.a., r is the
real rate of interest on long duration government debt, tpx is the (discrete)
probability that an individual of age x survives another t years, and T is the
oldest old age in the Life Tables. Consistent with the return estimates set
out in Section 4, we assume a at term structure, and set r as the geometric
mean of the annualized monthly yield on a 5 year Treasury Bond (Reserve
Bank of Australia series) divided by either the geometric mean ination or the
geometric mean of the maximum of the increase in the CPI or MTAWE, for
December 1989 June 2006. We compute tpx using the improved probabilities
literature on dynamic mortality modelling see Pitacco (2004) and references therein.
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for males/females from the 2002 Australian Life Tables. Table 4 sets out these
annuity values by gender and age.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
5.2 Risk of ruin
Table 5 shows the probability that an individual with a xed consumption
plan will run out of money before the end of life. In this example our investor
reaches age 65 and retires with a net $1,000,000 and then decides on a xed
real spending plan of between $40,000 and $100,000 each year. The lowest
retirement ruin probability for each draw-down rate is marked with an asterisk.
For 4-6% of initial retirement wealth, the Growth portfolio is least likely to
be exhausted, whereas at higher expenditure (8% of initial wealth) the High
Growth portfolio is safer.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
If preferences are measurable in terms of ruin probability, then a retiree might
use this table to decide on an investment and spending plan by trading o¤ an
increase in ruin probability against an increase in spending. However, main-
taining a constant real level of consumption is not an optimal strategy under
most conventional utility functions. As Brown (2000) points out, a constant
level of consumption (manifesting in complete unwillingness to transfer con-
sumption across time) implies innite risk aversion for an individual with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. And further, the utility
maximizing consumer with CRRA preferences will never allow wealth to fall to
zero because the marginal utility of consumption is innite at zero. Bayraktar
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and Young (2007) also show that ruin minimization and utility maximization
will be synonymous when consumption plans are linear in wealth (as for Hy-
perbolic Absolute Risk Aversion preferences) rather than when consumption
is xed at a some level.
5.3 Wealth value of the basic pension
Table 6 sets out the initial wealth needed to support a pension-equivalent pay-
ment for men and women of average improved mortality investing in managed
funds, and at ruin probabilities between 1, 3 and 5%. We compute this wealth
amount for age 65, noting that the average second-pillar retirement accumula-
tion of 60-65 year old Australians is around $44,000 for females and $130,000
for males (ASFA 2007).
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
The lowest retirement wealth for a 65 year-old female at a 1% ruin probabil-
ity is $379,000, invested in the Balanced portfolio. This amount is 8.6 times
current average retirement savings balances for this age group of women. By
contrast, commercial insurance rms o¤er CPI-indexed single life annuities
paying $14,000 p.a. at a premium of $338,000 (DeXX&R 2007). Allowing for
5% ruin lowers the required accumulation to $296,000.
For males, wealth requirements are similar to females at the 1% probability of
ruin. The slightly riskier growth portfolios, with 70% exposure to equity and
property assets are most e¢ cient for generating the real income stream. A 65
year old male needs $379,000, a sum about three times as large as estimates of
the current average male accumulation. A single-life, CPI-indexed annuity for
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a 65 year old male costs $329,000, which, again, is less costly than the phased
withdrawals (DeXX&R 2007).
Table 7 shows the wealth needed at retirement to generate a pension-equivalent
income stream that maintains both real value and parity with earnings.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
At our benchmark 1% probability of ruin, a 65 year old female needs $477,000
in retirement savings to generate the earnings- and ination-adjusted pen-
sion payment. This is 26% more than required wealth in Table 6, suggesting
that the value of linking the pension to MTAWE is substantial. Males require
$470,000, a 24% increase over the amount needed to match only ination in-
creases. The closest commercial single life annuity to the earnings-linked Age
Pension payment is a single life indexed to rise at 5% p.a. A 65 year old female
would pay $422,000 for a 5% indexed annuity paying $14,000 in the rst year,
whereas the premium for a male is currently $368,000, again, below the cost
of self-insurance via phased withdrawals (DeXX&R 2007).
5.4 Moneys worth
If we choose the least-cost investment strategy and allow the time of retire-
ment to vary, we can compare the moneys worth of pension-equivalent phased
withdrawal plans over a range of ages. The moneys worth is the ratio of the
expected net present value of the annuity stream to its purchase price (Mitchell
et al. 1999), or in our case, the ratio of the expected net present value of the
pension payment (Table 4) to required initial wealth of the phased withdrawals
(Tables 6 and 7).
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Studies of the moneys worth of immediate nominal single life annuities across
a range of countries nd that commercial o¤erings represent reasonable value
for consumers (James and Song 2001). For the US and Australia, Mitchell and
McCarthy (2004) and Doyle et al. (2004) report moneys worth ratios above
0.8 and 0.9 respectively. Similarly, Cannon and Tonks (2004) put the moneys
worth of UK annuities above 0.9.
In Figure 2 below, we graph the moneys worth of the least-cost phased with-
drawal as the age and gender of the pensioner varies. For women this is either
the Balanced or Growth portfolio, and for men, the Growth portfolio.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The moneys worth of the phased withdrawal strategy decreases with increas-
ing age, and is higher for females than for males. Most phased withdrawals
o¤er a moneys worth ratio below 0.5. The highest ratio is 0.52 for a 65 year old
female matching an ination-indexed payment, and the lowest is 0.29 for an
80-year-old male matching a CPI-MTAWE indexed payment. By comparison,
the moneys worth of the commercial immediate life annuities for CPI/CPI-
MTAWE indexing are 0.54/0.57 for males, and 0.59/0.56 for females at age
65.
Management fees are a major component of the cost of these self-insurance
strategies. Figure 3 graphs the impact of varying management fees from 0-2%
p.a. in the best phased withdrawal strategy for males and females aged 65
years. The moneys worth of each strategy declines linearly as fees increase:
the ratio for females falls by 0.15 as fees increase from 0-2%, and the ratio for
males falls less steeply by 0.12. The impact on wealth required at retirement
is substantial. For the CPI-MTAWE-indexed plans the di¤erence in wealth
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between zero and 2% fees for females is $126,867 and for males is $112,048. In
other words, for each 1% increase in fees, a retiree needs an additional $60,000
in wealth.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
6 Conclusion
One method for valuing a retirement income stream, including a public pen-
sion, is to calculate what it might cost to reproduce using alternative products.
Since the exact density function of the stochastic present value of any retire-
ment spending plan is not known when lifetimes are uncertain, here we use
a moment-matching approximation of Milevsky and Robinson (2000, 2005)
and Huang et al. (2004) to compare decumulation plans. We allow for a very
low probability of reaching ruinas a way of accounting for regulatory risk,
and back out the initial nest egg needed to replicate the payment and insur-
ance features of a simple real life annuity (the Australian basic pension) using
phased withdrawal products. This method gives a valuation of a basic pension
in terms of the cost of a similar self-insured draw-down plan.
We estimate the value of the Australian basic pension (the Age Pension) is in
the order of $450,000 at age 65 if the probability of ruin is 1%. This amount
is many times larger than current average personal retirement accumulations
and represents a substantial implicit transfer of public funds at retirement. Re-
quired wealth is generally larger for women because of longer life expectancy,
and harder for women to attain by private savings. Delaying retirement by
ve years reduces required wealth by 5% or less. On the other hand, 25%
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more wealth is needed to maintain the relativity of the pension with average
earnings, as compared with consumer prices, and around 6% more wealth is
needed for each 1% increase in investment management fees. The moneys
worth ratio of the phased withdrawal products surveyed here is generally less
than 0.5. And despite their marked unpopularity with the retired, commer-
cial life annuity products currently mimic public pension payment paths more
cheaply than drawn-downs from managed funds.
Appendix A: Rescaling the incomplete gamma function
A numerical complication arises from the fact that the incomplete gamma
function which appears in the moments (10) and (11) is di¢ cult to compute
because  b < 0 in our examples, and many software packages will not re-
turn gamma values dened over negative parameters. A rescaling derived from
Milevsky (2001) allows the incomplete gamma function to be rewritten over
( b+) > 0 where  is a positive integer.
To evaluate the moments (10) and (11) we need values of the incomplete
gamma function:
 (a; c)=
Z 1
c
e xx(a 1)dx (22)
= (a)(1 Ga(c)): (23)
where a =  b and c = exp
h
x m
b
i
: Milevsky (2001) suggests redening the
incomplete gamma function over, say, a+ 1 =  b+ 1.
Integrating (22) by parts gives
Z
e xx(a 1)dx = e x
1
a
xa +
1
a
Z
e xxadx; (24)
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and so
 (a; c) =  c
ae c
a
+
1
a
 (a+ 1; c): (25)
Using (25) we can rewrite  (a; c) as:
 (a; c) =
1
a
 (a+ 1)(1 Ga+1(c))  c
ae c
a
: (26)
Equation (26) is easily programmed into standard spreadsheet packages. When
 2 <  b <  1; we rescale to  b+ 2 using the recursion:
 (a; c) =
1
a
"
1
a+ 1
 (a+ 2)(1 Ga+2(c))  c
a+1e c
a+ 1
#
  c
ae c
a
:
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